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On November 12, 2001, American Airlines Flight 587, an Airbus A300, 
departed from John F. Kennedy International Airport. Shortly after takeoff, the 
aircraft encountered wake turbulence from a preceding departing aircraft. The 
aircraft upset caused the copilot flying the aircraft to use excessive rudder input in 
both directions, over-stressing the rudder and causing it to depart the aircraft 
(NTSB, 2001; NTSB, 2004a; NTSB, 2004b). All 260 people on the aircraft and five 
people on the ground were killed and the aircraft was destroyed.  
 
In the mishap report, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
highlighted two contributing factors. Both relate to the simulator training and its 
fidelity. First, incorrect rudder application was taught by simulator instructors. 
Second, the rudder pedal responses in the simulator were significantly different 
from the aircraft. The combination of the two may have caused the copilot to over-
control, leading to confusion and surprise (NTSB, 2001; NTSB, 2004a; NTSB, 
2004b). The rudder input fidelity differences were caused by software 
misrepresentation of an elastic cable stretch that was less stiff than the cable stretch 
in the aircraft (NTSB, 2001; NTSB, 2004a; NTSB, 2004b). The differences 
between the simulator and aircraft are shown in Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1. Fidelity differences between simulator and aircraft rudder pedal inputs 
(Courtesy of the NTSB, 2001). 
 
Fidelity, the degree to which the simulator looks like the real aircraft and 
the similarity to which it acts like the real aircraft, is closely linked to training 
transfer. (Allen, Hays, & Buffardi, 2001; Noble, 2002). Training transfer refers to 
the process by which knowledge, abilities, or skills acquired through training are 
applied to the actual situation (Hochmitz, & Yuviler-Gavish, 2011). Negative 
training transfer is the dampening effect of previous learning on the exercise of 
skills or on new learning (Blaiwes, Pug, & Regan, 2001). The presence of poor 
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fidelity may lead to negative training transfer with unsafe, even catastrophic results 
(Lee, 2009). Numerous mishaps, such as American Airlines Flight 587, can be 
illustrative of this theory. This paper, therefore, examines the efficacy of both high 
and low fidelity on training transfer and explores the flight simulator instructor’s 
role in exploiting the simulator’s strengths as a training tool while minimizing 
negative training transfer. 
 
Simulator Training History 
 
The history of flight simulation dates to 1929 when Edwin Link built his 
first Link Trainer. The device had a basic set of instruments, a primitive motion 
platform, and no visual display (Lee, 2009). When World War II began, the Link 
Trainer was integrated into flight training and used extensively. At the time, 
training accident rates were quite high and using simulators to reduce the aircraft 
accident rate was believed to be a logical outcome (Valverde, 1973). The training 
value of simulators substituting for aircraft was intuitive and based on common 
sense (Lee, 2009). After the war, rapid simulator progress was achieved due to 
many technological advancements during the war. Crucial to this evolution was the 
development of analog computers. However, the academic study of flight 
simulators did not start until around 1949 (Valverde, 1973). These studies continue 
in earnest today. 
 
 
Figure 2. Link Blue Box Trainer. 
(https://www.link.com/media/gallery/Link_Blue_Box_Training_2.jpg. Image 
Courtesy of L3 Link. Reprinted with permission.) 
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Advantages 
 
Simulators provide several advantages and are integral to modern aviation 
training programs. These advantages include (a) providing a safe environment to 
practice potentially dangerous procedures, such as an engine failure or rejected 
takeoff, that should not or cannot be performed in the aircraft, (b) significantly 
reducing training costs, (c) producing a positive impact on the environment by way 
of conservation of resources and reduced carbon footprint, (d) providing a research 
platform and laboratory, and (e) allowing rapid and multiple repetitions of events, 
such as instrument approaches and landings (Williges, Roscoe, & Williges, 2001). 
These many advantages have resulted in the requirement to use advanced 
simulators in the FAA’s Advanced Qualification Program (Longridge, 1997).  
 
 
 
Figure 3. Full Motion Level 3 / 4 Flight Simulators. BART International – 
Simulators at SimCom Training Center. (Retrieved from 
http://www.bartintl.com/content/simcom-pks-sim-bay3909rsjpg  Reprinted with 
permission.) 
 
Disadvantages 
 
Extensive simulator use for training does have some drawbacks, however. 
Some disadvantages of simulators include (a) simulator sickness, (b) inducing 
adaptation and compensatory skills, (c) poor motion cueing, (d) lack of user 
motivation, (e) a complex system architecture, (f) over-regulation, and (g) high 
costs associated with the most advanced simulators (Lee, 2009). Simulator sickness 
3
Myers et al.: Simulator Fidelity, Training Transfer, and the Role of Instructors
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018
is a form of motion sickness and can occur in both fixed and motion-based 
simulators. Symptoms exhibited by pilots include sweating, fatigue, dizziness, and 
vomiting (Lee, 2009). Pilots experiencing simulator sickness can be affected to the 
point of needing to stop the training (Stein & Robinski, 2012). Motion cueing, the 
algorithm used by simulators to align visual input with human motion sensing, is 
employed on the more advanced machines and is expensive to install and maintain 
(Williges et al., 2001). This process aims to replicate the feeling of being in a real 
aircraft. However, poor motion cueing can cause diminished fidelity and increased 
sickness.  
 
 Additionally, subjects know they are not in the aircraft potentially 
impacting pilot motivation. Their perception of the danger and stress level may be 
significantly reduced resulting in decisions that would not be made in the aircraft 
(Lee, 2009). For example, a pilot may elect to continue an unstable approach and 
attempt to land the aircraft in an unsafe situation. Whereas, if airborne, the decision 
may have been to go-around. Another disadvantage is the multitude of technical 
requirements of the simulator, creating a highly complex system architecture. 
Making changes to the simulator system architecture is often impeded by the 
plethora of government regulations in the certification process (Lee, 2009). Finally, 
cost, especially for smaller carriers, is a significant determinant of the level of 
fidelity that is incorporated into an operator’s training program and thus can be an 
impediment to widespread use of simulators (Lee, 2009).  
 
 
Figure 4. G1000 Part Task-Trainer. (Retrieved from http://www.flight1tech.com/ 
products/avionicssimulations/garming1000studentsimulatorsoftware.aspx. Flight 1 
Tech Systems. Reprinted with permission.) 
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Simulator Fidelity – Key Definitions 
 
Fidelity is a fundamental concept in simulator design and is comprised of 
three elements: physical fidelity, cognitive fidelity, and functional fidelity. These 
elements are defined as follows.  
 
Physical fidelity is the level to which the simulator replicates the 
physical aircraft flight deck and feel (Allen et al, 1986). Physical 
fidelity includes motion, visual, and sound replication. There are 
limits to physical fidelity: Schroeder and Chung (2001) and Vaden 
and Hall (2005) assert, for example, that current motion technology 
cannot replicate the actual motion cues a pilot would receive in 
coordinated flight to a 100% level. 
 
Cognitive fidelity refers to the ability of the simulator training 
environment to replicate the cognitive skills required on the flight 
deck (Lee, 2009). Specifically, factors that comprise cognitive 
fidelity include psychological and perceptive factors such as 
situational awareness, anxiety, stress, and decision making (Taber, 
2014).  
 
Functional fidelity is defined as to what degree the simulator acts 
like the real equipment (Allen et al., 1986).  
 
Another important definition related to fidelity is task, which is a goal or 
problem to be solved (Lintern, 2001). It is important to distinguish between a 
simulator and trainer as well. A simulator is a device that represents a specific 
counterpart aircraft whereas a trainer represents a particular class of vehicles 
(Williges et al., 2001).  
 
 Havighurst, Fields, and Fields (2010) define high fidelity as the required 
equipment and materials necessary to adequately simulate the task the learner is 
expected to perform. They define low fidelity as equipment and materials that are 
less similar to what task the learner is expected to perform.   
 
Self-efficacy is the belief in one’s capabilities to correctly perform a task. 
Generally, high-perceived self-efficacy can lead to positive performance outcomes 
(Holbrook & Cennamo, 2014).  
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High-fidelity Simulators 
 
High-fidelity simulators have been shown to increase self-efficacy 
(Holbrook & Cennamo, 2014). Taber (2014) reinforces this point stating that 
reducing simulator capability to the minimum level impedes confidence in future 
skill performance. This, in turn, impedes the development of necessary coping 
strategies. Many simulator designers, operators, technicians, and behavioral 
scientists believe that the simulator should be designed with the maximum fidelity 
possible since that is postulated to provide the most training transfer. However, 
doing so results in higher costs that may not be feasible for some organizations 
(Lintern, Sheppard, Parker, Yates, & Nolan, 1989).  
 
The final component of understanding the nature of fidelity includes Hays 
and Singer’s (1989) four levels of fidelity. Level 1 is considered high fidelity and 
includes two aspects: precise reproduction of the operational counterpart and 
deliberate reduction in fidelity to reduce costs without compromising training 
effectiveness. The other three levels have incremental reductions in the level of 
fidelity (Hays & Singer, 1989). For this paper, fidelity refers to the extent to which 
the training situation must be similar to the actual aircraft situation in order to 
provide effective training.   
 
The development of high fidelity simulators requires the ongoing 
engagement of stakeholders throughout the process. Naweed, Ward, Gourlay, and 
Dawson (2017) suggest cross-disciplinary teams with a transdisciplinary approach 
are most beneficial. This allows for sharing of knowledge and innovation from one 
field to another. Such practices, they argue, supports this collaboration where teams 
are better able to anticipate challenges, formulate resolutions, and establish more 
innovative responses to promote fidelity of simulators (Naweed et al., 2017).  
   
Simulator Fidelity and Transfer of Training 
 
There is considerable debate regarding the effect of simulator fidelity on 
training transfer, particularly regarding the impact of motion on training transfer. 
When performance in the aircraft is better than if there was no simulator training 
provided, this is called positive training transfer. Conversely, negative training 
transfer refers to those situations when performance in the aircraft is poorer than if 
there was no pre-training at all (Listern, 2001). Several studies concluded that low 
fidelity resulted in negative training transfer, while other studies concluded that the 
degree of simulator fidelity had little or no effect on training transfer, making the 
subject contentious among training experts (Listern, 2001).  
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When considering training transfer, it can be further divided into three sub-
areas: self-transfer, near transfer, and far transfer. Self-transfer is the decrement or 
improvement in training transfer resulting from the repeated practice of the same 
event. Near transfer is the decrement or improvement in training transfer resulting 
from practicing different but similar events. Far transfer is the decrement or 
improvement in training transfer resulting from the repeated practice of dissimilar 
events (Noble, 2002).  
   
The Debate 
 
Simulator Fidelity Does Not Affect Training Transfer 
 
Studies regarding simulator fidelity are inconclusive and, at times, 
seemingly contradictory, with many asserting fidelity does not affect training 
transfer while others affirm impacts. Burki-Cohen, Go, and Longridge (2001) 
researched engine failure scenarios that resulted in either a rejected take-off or 
continued take-off. They concluded from their study that motion for these tasks did 
not affect evaluation and training simulator progress or transfer of training. The 
authors, while exploring fidelity background information, did note that motion 
improved pilot performance and control behavior when performing disturbance and 
tracking tasks for low stability aircraft in the simulator (Burki-Cohen et al, 2001). 
 
Norman, Dore, and Grierson (2012) in a study of medical students 
performing clinical tasks in high-fidelity and low-fidelity simulators concluded that 
there was no significant advantage (average differences 11% to 2%) of the high-
fidelity simulator use over the low-fidelity simulator. In a similar study, Fraser, 
Peets, Walker, Tworek, Paget, Wright, and McLaughlin (2009) conducted a 
medical students’ training study using a cardiorespiratory simulator (CRS). While 
the simulator improved results when compared to students who did not use a 
simulator, students displayed only a limited ability to transfer skills learned to other 
real-world problems (Fraser et al, 2009).  
 
Lintern et al. (1989) note in their study of ground attack bombing that 
decreasing physical fidelity does not always lead to a decrease in training transfer. 
Specifically, there was no difference in performance among crews using three 
different visual simulation fields of view (Litern et al, 1989; Williges et al., 2001). 
The researchers specifically mention, however, that visual simulation is needed for 
ground-referenced maneuvers where high danger is present, such as high-speed/low 
altitude military operations. They advocate that as learning changes, more 
experience is gained (Lintern et al., 1989; Williges et al., 2001). Thus, fidelity 
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requirements change as learning progresses. Additionally, fidelity requirements 
will also change based on learner ability and skill.  
 
In a study of engine failure scenarios on takeoff, it was noted that no 
significant training transfer differences between pilots who used motion and those 
who did not. In the same study, however, the authors note that a lack of fidelity in 
Air Traffic Control (ATC) communications offers an incomplete cognitive 
environment and creates a false sense of simplicity to the pilots (Bürki-Cohen, 
Boothe, Soja, DiSario, Go, & Longridge, 2000). This viewpoint is echoed by Lee 
(2009) who stated that sound provides pilots needed feedback on both aircraft 
systems and ATC communications to more fully simulate the aircraft operating 
environment.    
 
Vaden and Hall (2005) concluded that simulator performance and the 
follow-on transfer performance did not show a direct relation. Additionally, 
empirical evidence supporting the use of motion to improve training transfer is 
lacking. Conclusions from the researchers cited in Vaden and Hall’s (2005) study 
include the following: 
• A comparison of T-37 pilot training students who used 
motion and those who did not use motion yielded no 
practical or statistical differences 
• In a study of T-2C aircraft landings, motion was found to 
provide no statistical benefit 
• In a study of F-16 maneuver training in a fixed versus motion 
simulator, there were no significant statistical differences in 
performance, although it was noted that motion tended to 
improve performance in some areas and degraded it in others 
 
Neither field of view nor scene detail influenced training transfer from the 
simulator to the aircraft (Caretta & Dunlap, 1998; Lintern & Garrison, 1992; 
Lintern et al., 1997). Dahlström (2008) in a study of pilot training students up to 
the first solo offered the following conclusions: 
• High fidelity simulation has not necessarily resulted in 
improved opportunities for learning coordinative and 
cognitive skills 
• Despite high pilot acceptance, convincing visual effects, 
and apparent validity of high-fidelity simulators, there is no 
certainty as to whether training quality is improved 
• With the introduction of new technology, operator work 
demands are changed and new ways of performance and 
possibilities for new forms of accidents can surface 
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• To equate fidelity with better training reflects a limited 
view on training 
 
Simulator Fidelity Does Affect Training Transfer 
 
Though many findings suggest no impact on training transfer by fidelity, 
much research suggests fidelity does have an effect. Holbrook and Cennamo (2014) 
in their study of high-fidelity and self-efficacy with law enforcement officers found 
that high fidelity increased self-efficacy, emotional arousal, and led to positive 
training transfer from the lessons learned in the simulator scenarios. The study 
subjects remarked that no previous experience had prepared them as well as this 
simulator period. Additionally, they commented that there was no experience better 
than this because the simulator scenarios were so realistic (Holbrook & Cennamo, 
2014). 
 
A study of platform-based simulator motion concluded that, for pilot 
coordinated maneuvers, the motion platform must translate laterally when it rolls. 
If not, the pilot feels an uncoordinated turn and the needle and ball indicate a slip 
(Schroeder & Chung, 2001). The study determined that as the motion cues 
degraded, both objective and subjective evaluation results worsened (Schroeder & 
Chung, 2001). 
 
Testing Boeing 747-400 Captains and First Officers in four maneuvers, 
including both engine failure scenarios during takeoff and engine-out landing 
maneuvers, Burki-Cohen et al. (2003) determined the advantage of motion fidelity 
was small for the engine failures on takeoff. However, the results demonstrated the 
early alerting function of motion (Burki-Cohen et al., 2003). In the other 
maneuvers, only very slight differences were noted, such as the motion group had 
slightly longer and softer landings than the non-motion group. No difference in 
performance was noted during recurrent evaluations indicating there was no benefit 
for recurrent training (Burki-Cohen et al., 2003).  
 
Advocating that the closer the simulation is to real-world conditions, the 
better the transfer of skills, it was found that a high level of cognitive and physical 
fidelity was required for Helicopter Underwater Egress Training (programs) 
(Baldwin & Ford, 1988; Hochmitz & Yuviler-Gavish, 2011; Taber, 2014). Doing 
so provides individuals the ability to practice whole-task skill demonstration in 
several critical areas and provides the best transfer of training.  
 
Bürki-Cohen et al. (2000) in their study noted that in an FAA-sponsored 
review of AC120-40B, Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) from industry, the FAA, 
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and academia generally perceived the absence of motion to likely have detrimental 
effects on pilot control performance. This is especially true when performing 
maneuvers where sudden motion onset cueing with limited visual references occur.  
 
Motion is necessary for correct control inputs, especially for maneuvers that 
involve high-G tolerance and spatial disorientation avoidance (Viden & Hall, 
2005). Specifically, during training, trainees who receive no-motion training can 
never achieve the same performance level as those with motion training. They 
conclude:  
• If pilot performance is dependent on motion in flight, then 
the simulator with motion will provide better transfer than 
the simulator without motion 
• A lack of motion caused trainees to be less successful in 
developing flight control strategies than those trainees who 
had practiced the skill with motion 
• Generally, student pilot and instructor feedback indicate 
that including motion provides greater simulator acceptance 
and meets pilot performance expectations 
• Pilots preferred motion to no motion when the task was to 
control an unstable aircraft 
• In a study of helicopter coupled-hover departure 
procedures, motion was found to have a positive statistical 
effect on pilot performance (Viden & Hall, 2005) 
 
For high-altitude stall recovery and overbank recovery, motion improved 
results in vertical motion simulators (Zaal, Schroeder, & Chung, 2015). 
Additionally, simulation motion needs to be intense and abrupt enough to provide 
the appropriate stimulus that the pilot can detect and input an appropriate control 
response (Caro, 2001a). Pilot survey ratings of motion support this assertion (Zaal 
et al., 2015). In approach and landing with sidestep and engine out on takeoff, little 
difference was noted in training transfer (Zaal et al., 2015).  
 
Those trainees who were trained with simulators that had high-
physical/high-functional fidelity or high-physical/medium-functional fidelity were 
found to repeat assigned tasks less frequently (Allen, Hays, & Buffardi, 1986). In 
contrast, the highest number of required repeated attempts occurred for those 
trainees who were using medium-function/low-physical fidelity simulators. Thus, 
the authors concluded that both functional and physical fidelity had a strong effect 
on performance. Additionally, lower physical fidelity was associated with longer 
solution times. Finally, they concluded that given the physical and functional 
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fidelity relationships discovered, functional and physical fidelity should not be 
dealt with in isolation (Allen et al., 1986). 
 
Allen, Park, and Cook (2010), in their study on simulator driving scenarios, 
found that those subjects training in a cab with a full-sized projected image had the 
lowest crash rate and exhibited the least aggressive driving behavior. However, the 
authors note several confounding variables were present which could have affected 
the results.  
 
Noble (2002) in his study, concluded that learner skill level must be 
considered when determining fidelity. As the learner skill level improves, low-
quality fidelity devices become less effective when one considers the cost to build 
them versus training efficiency. The learning stage of the student, the goals of the 
training, and the level of fidelity are not mutually exclusive. Additionally, Noble 
(2002) concluded from a study of KC-135 boom operators using a Boom-Operator 
Part-Task Trainer (BOPTT), that both the environment and the task must be 
considered when studying training transfer.  
 
Hochmitz and Yuviler-Gavish (2011) conducted a simple study that divided 
respondents into two groups consisting of a physical fidelity group and a cognitive 
fidelity group. A three-dimensional virtual simulator was used. Performance 
measures included training time, number of final errors, test time, number of 
corrected errors, and time used to correct errors. The authors concluded that for 
development of procedural skills in psychomotor tasks, a training approach using 
both cognitive and physical training was required. 
 
Lintern (2001) in his study concluded that skill transfer was based on some 
type of similarity between the operational and training experience. His basic 
premise is that the level of transfer is based on the extent to which the two 
environments share common components.      
     
Simulator Fidelity Training Transfer 
 
After examining the various studies, the contradictory results of training 
transfer were found to be caused primarily by lack of clearly defined study 
methodologies, variances in study methodologies, and variances in the individual 
tasks studied. Several authors note the study methodology problems (Caretta & 
Dunlap, 1998; Vaden & Hall, 2005). Besides methodology problems, Caretta and 
Dunlap (1998) also highlight lack of understanding of the mission and lack of true 
simulator-to-aircraft transfer studies as contributors to conflicting results. Other 
variables found to significantly influence results of studies include (a) criterion 
11
Myers et al.: Simulator Fidelity, Training Transfer, and the Role of Instructors
Published by Scholarly Commons, 2018
measures where subjective measurements are used, (b) the subjects who have 
different motor skills and cognitive capabilities, and (c) the instructor, who plays 
an important role because of biases, attitudes, motivation, and abilities (Valverde, 
1973).  
 
It is understandable that results varied as often the specific tasks studied 
also varied from study to study. For example, for upset recoveries, such as 
American Flight 587, the NTSB, FAA, and other authors (Munshi, Lababidi, & 
Alyousef, 2015; Vaden & Hall, 2005; Zaal et al., 2015) agree that high fidelity is 
needed. For a task, such as being able to locate a switch in the cockpit, a part-task 
trainer consisting of a cockpit diagram pasted on a piece of cardboard may suffice. 
However, part-trainers are limited in their use (Caro, 2001b).  
 
Ultimately, the amount of fidelity needed is specific to the training 
objective, the individual task being trained, and the learning level of the student 
(Caretta & Dunlap, 1998; Lee, 2009). Blaiwes et al. (2001) support this assertion 
and further support the variance in study results. Different flight task types transfer 
differently (Blaiwes et al., 2001). Further, Blaiwes et al. (2001) conclude (a) 
particular motion types affect trainee training transfer and performance, (b) the 
level of fidelity and type of trainer notably influences transfer, and (c) careful 
specification of operational and trainer tasks is necessary to maximize training 
transfer.     
 
Finally, the FAA provides regulatory guidance through the Advanced 
Qualification Program (AQP), Advanced Simulation Plan (ASP) and Advisory 
Circular (AC)120-40b on simulator fidelity (Burki-Cohen, Go, & Longridge, 2001; 
FAA, 2017). The AQP is designed to respond to changing training needs providing 
pilots who not only have the requisite knowledge and hands-on skill but also are 
proficient integrating cognitive and motor skills. The FAA is committed to 
effectively preparing pilots to carry passengers. Thus, simulators must represent the 
motor and cognitive challenges that would be experienced in an operational 
environment. Additionally, the simulators must be sufficient to ensure full transfer 
of performance and behaviors that would be experienced in the air (Burki-Cohen, 
et al., 2001). To change regulatory guidance regarding fidelity, consistent study 
results must present unequivocal evidence to prove that high-fidelity is not required 
for the individual tasks in question (Bürki-Cohen, et al., 2000). 
     
Safety and Fidelity 
 
Improved safety outcomes are among the key factors in desiring appropriate 
12
International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 5 [2018], Iss. 1, Art. 6
https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol5/iss1/6
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2018.1203
fidelity within training environments. To better understand the relationship between 
safety and simulator fidelity, a search was conducted of the NTSB website for 
safety recommendations that included the word simulator for the aviation 
transportation mode. The search returned 37 results that consisted of 29 
recommendations for procedure changes and 8 fidelity improvements. These 
recommendations are the result of commercial or business aircraft mishaps and are 
summarized chronologically below: 
     
Eastern Airlines Flight 66. On June 24, 1975, Flight 66, a Boeing 727, 
crashed while executing a precision approach to John F. Kennedy Airport in 
Jamaica, New York, killing 113 people. The aircraft was flying through or at the 
base of a mature thunderstorm. The NTSB recognized that from this mishap and 
other mishaps, thunderstorms were a problem. Therefore, the NTSB recommended 
that wind shear models be developed for simulators to train pilots on the effects of 
mature thunderstorms (NTSB, 1976). 
 
Pan Am Flight 759. On July 9, 1982, Flight 759 crashed while taking off 
from New Orleans International Airport in Kenner, Louisiana, killing 145 people 
on the aircraft and 8 people on the ground. Windshear conditions had been detected 
by the airport just prior to takeoff and there were heavy rain showers on the 
departure path. Because of this mishap and other mishaps involving wind shear, the 
NTSB recommended that realistic microburst wind models be incorporated into 
flight simulator training programs (NTSB, 1982). 
 
Rejected Takeoffs. After a series of mishaps related to high-speed rejected 
takeoffs, the NTSB issued two safety recommendations: A-90-043 and A-90-044. 
As part of the A-90-043 recommendation, the NTSB required, to the maximum 
extent possible, that cues and cockpit warnings that resulted in high speed rejected 
takeoffs for other than engine failures be incorporated. An example would be a tire 
failure during takeoff. Additionally, A-90-044 required that all simulators of 
passenger carrying operators accurately produce stopping distance available for a 
rejected takeoff (NTSB, 1990). 
 
China Eastern Airlines, flight 583.  On April 6, 1993, Flight 583 was 
flying from Beijing to Los Angeles when the slats inadvertently deployed during 
cruise flight. The Captain flew the aircraft through several violent pitch oscillations 
and lost 5,000 feet. Two passengers were fatally injured and 149 passengers and 7 
crewmembers were injured to some degree. As a result of the mishap, the NTSB 
recommended that the Douglas Aircraft Company provide data needed to upgrade 
the MD-11 simulators to accurately represent the longitudinal stability and control 
characteristics of the aircraft (NTSB,1993). 
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 U.S. Airways Flight 427. September 8, 1994, Flight 427, a Boeing 737, 
crashed while maneuvering to land at the Pittsburgh International Airport in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The aircraft descended uncontrollably and impacted the 
terrain killing all 132 people on board and destroying the aircraft. The cause of the 
mishap was an un-commanded rudder reversal which caused the aircraft to depart 
controlled flight. In the mishap report, the NTSB stated that the simulator 
characteristics developed by Boeing and implemented by air carriers in simulators 
did not adequately represent the crossover airspeed phenomenon and suggested that 
the fidelity be addressed since data is readily available from flight tests (NTSB, 
1999).  
 
Tower Air Flight 41. December 20, 1995, Flight 41, a Boeing 747, veered 
off the left side of the runway while taking off from John F. Kennedy Airport in 
Jamaica, New York. There were no fatalities, but 24 passengers received minor 
injuries, one flight attendant received serious injuries, and the aircraft sustained 
substantial damage. The primary cause of the mishap was the failure to reject the 
takeoff after loss of directional control. The NTSB stated their concern with the 
inability of pilots to attain needed training for slippery runway procedures due to 
poor simulator fidelity. They also found that while the Boeing simulators provided 
a more accurate model, the air carrier simulators did not. Thus, the NTSB 
concluded that improvements in slippery runway handling fidelity in 747 flight 
simulators were both needed and feasible (NTSB, 1996).      
 
Airborne Express. On December 22, 1996, an Airborne Express Douglas 
DC-8 crashed into mountainous terrain near Narrows, Virginia. The three 
crewmembers and three maintenance personnel on the functional check flight were 
killed and the aircraft was destroyed. The primary cause of the mishap was 
improper applied control inputs during a stall recovery attempt. The NTSB 
evaluation of the simulator fidelity found that the simulator did not produce the stall 
characteristics of the DC-8 with adequate fidelity. Thus, the crew was provided 
with a misleading expectation of the aircraft’s handling characteristics. The NTSB 
recommended the FAA evaluate all simulator stall characteristics in air carrier 
simulators and change them as necessary to represent to the maximum extent 
possible the stall characteristics of each aircraft (NTSB, 1997).  
 
Global Exec Aviation Bombardier Learjet Model 60. On September 19, 
2008, a Bombardier Learjet overran the runway during a rejected takeoff at the 
Columbia Metropolitan Airport in Columbia, South Carolina. Two passengers, the 
Captain, and the First Officer were killed and two other passengers were seriously 
injured. The right main landing gear tire had separated from the wheel causing 
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vibration and shaking of the airframe and subsequent failure of the three main 
landing gear tires during the attempted takeoff rejection. As part of the 
recommendation to provide realistic tire failure training, the NTSB recommended 
that the FAA define and codify minimum simulator fidelity for tire failure scenarios 
(NTSB, 2010). 
 
Based on their analysis, it is clear the NTSB considers simulator fidelity in 
certain tasks a fundamental requirement to safely execute flight maneuvers. These 
eight examples offer insight into mishaps where simulator fidelity, while not a 
direct cause of the accident, was identified as a contributing factor. If improved, 
simulator fidelity may well help prevent similar occurrences. Some industry 
stakeholders and researchers would assert that since commercial aviation is 
remarkably safe and instances of negative transfer from simulators are rare, the risk 
of maintaining the status quo is acceptable. Conversely, it could be argued that 
between just the eight mishap recommendations listed above, 410 lives were lost 
and that is unacceptable. The moral dilemma is determining the correct balance 
between cost-effectiveness and safety. These eight safety recommendations made 
by the NTSB, however, reinforce that the agency views increased fidelity as a 
fundamental requirement in enhancing safety. One such way to do so is to 
understand the ways in which the instructor may impact training transfer.   
   
The Instructor’s Role in Maximizing Training Transfer 
 
The simulator training process is made of three parts that include (a) the 
simulator, (b) the training syllabus and associated objectives, and (c) the instructor 
(Lee, 2009). The simulator itself does not train, as it is simply a tool used in the 
training process. Simulator design and flight training syllabi development receive 
significant attention from various stakeholders. The instructor, however, is often 
overlooked in this process despite the role of the instructor as a key element in the 
success of training (Lee, 2009). It was found that a flight instructor influenced the 
student’s progress more than syllabi variations or the simulator (Valverde, 1973). 
In the most recent AC 120-54A, Advanced Qualification Program, considered the 
agency’s most advanced and dynamic training system, the FAA asserts in the 
section Instructors and Evaluators that “Instructors, evaluators, and supervisors are 
the backbone of the Advanced Qualification Program” (FAA, 2017, p. 63).   
 
The simulator instructor has many duties and plays many roles. The 
instructor must be familiar with simulator capabilities and limitations, know the 
lesson objectives, and instruct to attain the best performance from individual 
students who vary in attitude, hands-on skill level, and cognitive ability (Lintern et 
al., 1989). The instructor’s role is to obtain the highest performance possible from 
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the student for a task while optimizing the time in the simulator period to do so. 
Simulator instructors must also be familiar with and role-play air traffic controllers, 
ground/dispatch/maintenance personnel, and other crew positions throughout 
numerous training scenarios.  
 
It is imperative that the instructor identify the differences between the 
simulator and the aircraft to prevent known simulator deficiencies from creating a 
negative training transfer. This requires an extensive knowledge of and/or 
experience in the actual aircraft to be able to discern the differences (Lintern et al., 
1989). The fidelity gaps must be filled in by instructing the students on the 
deficiencies of the simulator. Caro (2001a) concluded from his pilot training study 
that the instructors tended to concentrate on procedural task during simulator 
training and not emphasize the training value of the simulators regarding dynamic 
flight tasks.  
 
Additionally, if the trainee develops a negative attitude toward the simulator 
and instruction, the attitude may carry over to the aircraft (Valverde, 1973). As 
such, the instructor’s attitude toward the simulator capabilities must remain positive 
to elicit an increase in psychological fidelity and to improve self-efficacy 
(Valverde, 1973). Blaiwes et al. (2001), in their study of the transfer of training and 
measurement of training effectiveness, echo this conclusion. How a device is used 
may influence transfer and learning to a higher degree than trainer design (Blaiwes 
et al., 2001).  
 
The instructor’s role in minimizing the disadvantages of the simulator are 
key to a successful training transfer (Lee, 2009). The most significant disadvantage, 
simulator sickness, requires the instructor to be knowledgeable on the 
circumstances that cause simulator sickness, the symptoms of it, and how to 
minimize the effects of simulator sickness by effectively using motion. Further, 
motion cueing should only be used when the training task dictates to minimize 
maintenance breakdowns and simulator sickness (Lee, 2009).  
Adaptation and compensatory skills will be required to some degree from 
the pilots. The instructor must communicate to the pilots the differences in 
simulator and aircraft performance so pilots can be familiar with the differences 
and not be surprised when operating the aircraft (Lee, 2009). If the adaptation and 
compensatory skills are excessive, the instructor has the obligation to report those 
discrepancies to maintenance and/or pilot training management personnel for 
further action. To enhance user motivation, the instructor can point out the 
advantages of the simulator, encourage pilots to take advantage of the training 
opportunity to hone their skills, and maintain a positive attitude concerning 
simulator capabilities to the student pilots. By using various features of the 
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simulator such as the reposition function, the instructor can optimize time in the 
trainer and reduce the overall training costs (Lee, 2009).  
 
It is sometimes advocated to use part-task trainers as a cost savings measure 
and these seem to have some utility in initial training. However, as noted by 
Williges et. al. (2001), training using only part-task trainers results in pilots not 
having the opportunity to practice time-sharing attention among the many tasks 
required on the flight deck. The simulator, the training syllabi and associated 
objectives, and the instructor must work in harmony for the training to be effective 
(Lee, 2009). Quality simulators alone cannot provide adequate training to students 
with recent studies suggesting the degree of fidelity within a simulator is 
independent of training efficacy. Rather, high fidelity within simulators is most 
associated with positive training outcomes where systematic integration through 
quality instructional programming allows for learner engagement as well as the 
suspension of disbelief (Hamstra, Brydges, Hatala, Zendejas, & Cook, 2014).  
 
To evaluate simulator effectiveness, Lee (2009) developed the Transfer 
Effectiveness Ratio (TER). It uses a formula: TER = (A – AS)/S, where A is the 
aircraft training time not including simulator training, S is the simulator training 
time, and AS is total training time. A positive result indicates positive training 
transfer while a negative result represents negative training transfer. However, the 
results can be skewed towards the positive if the instructor rapidly repositions and 
reconfigures the simulator (Lee, 2009). This practice is commonly utilized in 
simulator training to optimize training time. Additionally, conducting the study to 
derive the needed information to determine the values of the equations can also be 
problematic. As such, one equation is not enough when evaluating the effectiveness 
of a training device. 
 
  Williges et al. (2001) assert more aspects are required, listing three criteria 
necessary for evaluating a training device: (a) how effective the current learning is, 
(b) the learning transfer from one situation to another, and (c) learning retention. 
The optimal solution is for academia, training departments, examiners, and the 
FAA to agree on the goals and expectations of simulator fidelity related to specific 
tasks (Noble, 2002). It should be remembered that the primary purpose of the 
simulator is not to replicate the exact physical representation of the flight deck, but 
instead to create the experience of the flight environment and provide a realistic 
and economical training platform (Lee, 2009).  
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Figure 5. ATR 600 Flight Simulator with Instructor Station. (Retrieved from 
http://www.ainonline.com/sites/default/files/uploads/2014/02/500-ain-sing-atr-
training-sim-in-singapore-1.jpg. Courtesy of AIN. Reprinted with permission.)  
 
Instructional Design Models and the Role of the Instructor  
 
On a final note, it is important to consider that the simulator instructor is on 
the delivery end of the instructional design model. The objectives, content, delivery 
schedule, and other instructional components have been largely developed, 
approved and, in many cases, codified into FAA requirements and practices. This 
leaves the simulator instructor with little control over course content. To provide 
the best possible products to the instructor for utilization in training, current best 
practices for instructional design must be employed. Dozens of respected 
instructional design models may be employed throughout various factions of the 
aviation training industry. Among the most commonly used and research-supported 
models, particularly in training environments, are Gagne’s nine learning events and 
John Keller’s motivational ARCS model.  
 
Gagne’s (1970) nine steps of instructional design include (a) gaining 
attention, (b) informing the learner of the objectives, (c) stimulating recall prior to 
learning, (d) presenting stimulus, (e) providing learning guidance, (f) eliciting 
performance, (g) providing feedback, (h) assessing performance, and (i) enhancing 
retention and transfer. Let us consider this model in a simulation training 
environment, including the pre-brief, simulator training, and debrief as shown in 
Table 1.  
 
In conjunction with Gagne’s nine-step instructional design process, other 
models may be employed. John Keller’s motivation-based ARCS model, 
commonly utilized for adult learners, provides an adjustment for those learners who 
constantly live in an accelerated and multi-task mode (Afip, 2014). ARCS, short 
for (a) attention, (b) relevance, (c) confidence, and (d) satisfaction, is designed to 
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supplement the learning process by stimulating and sustaining the learner’s 
motivation to learn (Afip, 2014).  
 
Table 1 
Gagne’s Nine Step Model Applied to Simulator Training 
Pre-Brief Simulator Debrief 
Steps a, b, and c are 
presented in the 
simulator pre-brief 
where the simulator 
profile is reviewed and 
students are queried on 
knowledge.  
Steps d, e, f, and g are 
accomplished in the 
simulator. The stimulus 
presented, step d, is the 
simulator and tasks 
assigned. Learning 
guidance, step e, is 
provided by the 
instructor who provides 
coaching as required to 
accomplish the tasks. 
Eliciting performance, 
step f, is accomplished 
by instructor who 
provides the instruction 
and motivation to the 
students to accomplish 
the tasks.  
 
Providing feedback, step 
g, is accomplished by the 
instructor who provides 
feedback to the students 
on their performance, 
with guidance as to how 
to improve the 
performance if 
warranted. Steps g, h, 
and i are accomplished 
during the simulator 
debrief. Students are 
provided more feedback 
on their performance, 
performance is graded, 
and techniques are 
provided as to how to 
best retain and learn the 
information or tasks. 
 
 
Attention refers to the level of interest taking in ideas and concepts. Usually, 
attention is obtained by either perceptual or inquiry arousal. Ensuring the 
instruction and topic are pertinent to the learners comprises the relevance portion 
(Afip, 2014). This is generally accomplished by using clear language and examples 
the learner is familiar with. Confidence is achieved by establishing a learner’s 
positive expectation for achieving success. Establishing confidence can be achieved 
by specifying performance requirements and learning standards. Concerning 
satisfaction, the idea is for the learners to obtain satisfaction or reward from the 
learning experience (Afip, 2014). Feedback and reinforcement are key elements to 
achieve this goal.   
 
Employing well-validated methods of instructional design geared towards 
the typical audience within simulators allows instructors to better engage with their 
students. This engagement can lead to increased training transfer as well as 
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improved outcomes as instruction relates to fidelity within simulators. Where 
instructors have the platform to discuss the nuances of a particular simulator and 
adjust their methods to meet those needs, learners will better understand how the 
experience in the simulator relates to the real experience.  
 
Recommendations for Further Research 
 
 The authors suggest the following expansions for further research into the 
realm of simulator fidelity and instruction. First, future FAA research should focus 
on implementing current best practices with elements of established models such 
as Gagne’s nine learning events and John Keller’s motivational ARCS model. In 
addition, all stakeholders should coordinate further research to determine fidelity 
shortfalls for simulator tasks that may be specific to each aircraft or maneuver. 
Finally, this study does not address the unique differences in motion and non-
motion simulation as they relate to fidelity, training transfer, and the role of 
instructors. As such, the authors suggest this as an important avenue for further 
research.  
 
Conclusion 
 
As established in the literature, fidelity is a difficult concept to attain 
agreement on, particularly when one considers the various levels of fidelity that 
may be present within the same simulator depending on the task performed. 
Further, despite copious research regarding simulation and fidelity, relatively few 
studies on the instructor’s roles, responsibility, and their overall impact on the 
training product have been conducted. Current research and assessment practices 
were evaluated with recommendations for incorporating instructional design (ISD) 
principles and identifying and instructing fidelity shortfalls. This was done to 
explore the flight simulator instructor’s role in exploiting the simulator’s strengths 
as a training tool while minimizing negative training transfer. It is proposed that 
ISD practices will ensure simulator instructors are provided with the most current 
and appropriate teaching tools. These improvements, along with standardized 
research methods analyzing fidelity will optimize valuable simulator time and 
ensure students are getting the best possible training to take back to the aircraft.  
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